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The Effect of Delivery Windows on the Variance
of Flow Time and On-Time Delivery

Abstract
A critical outcome that buyers seek is the timely delivery of the products that they
purchase from suppliers. Delivery windows have been proposed as a means to achieve this
goal. This paper analyzes the effect of buyer-specified delivery windows on the supplier's
flow time variance, flow time allowance, inventory, expected tardiness, and probability of
on-time delivery. The results confirm that using delivery windows may have the effect
that the supplier's preferred action would be to reduce flow time allowance and variance.
Whether on-time delivery performance improves is analyzed for linear and exponential
variance cost functions. The results indicate that when the cost of maintaining lower
variances grows exponentially, variance reduction does not lead to more timely deliveries.
1. Introduction

A delivery window is a period of time, specified by the buyer, in which delivery is
desired. Deliveries before the delivery window period begins are forbidden. Deliveries
that occur after the delivery window period are considered tardy, and may be subject to
penalties. When the delivery occurs within the window the buyer accepts delivery and
does not impose any penalties.
The use of delivery windows is documented by Fawcett and Birou [5), Corbett [3),
and Kumar and Sharman [14). Fawcett and Birou use a Likert scale to assess the degree
of implementation of various JIT techniques. Use of delivery time windows was ranked
fourth out of 14 in implementation status. Delivery time windows were implemented at
a level of 5.10 out of 7, where 7 was described as "fully implemented." The highest level
of implementation was 5. 79. Long-term partnerships, blanket orders, and supplier certification scored higher in level of implementation. They state, " ...the use of [delivery) time
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windows is viewed as a type of insurance against nonperformance and the cost of failures
in physical support of JIT sourcing." Reviewing this same data, Fawcett [4] indicates that
approximately 10% of suppliers surveyed do not use delivery time windows at all. A little
over 41% are at some stage of implementing delivery windows with some of their carriers
and suppliers. Close to 48% of the suppliers heavily use them with the majority of their
carriers and suppliers, and have relatively well defined delivery time windows.
Corbett [3] describes a case study where the manufacturer quotes an earliest and latest
delivery date rather than a single due date. The manufacturer supplies office furniture to
buying firms that install it. These buyers typically operate in a project management
environment. The early and late start dates for the installation task define the delivery
window. Corbett states: "delivery windows offer the ability to improve the on-time delivery
performance or dependability." Capacity smoothing methods using the delivery windows
are proposed to create a degree of flexibility in scheduling the work.
Kumar and Sharman [14] indicate that delivery windows at supermarkets have decreased from four hours to one hour. They discuss the competitive advantages that suppliers can obtain through on-time delivery and suggest means of achieving on-time delivery.
Their recommendation is an application of gap analysis [18]. Kumar and Sharman identify
three causes of gaps between delivery expectations and perceived delivery performance.
The calibration gap occurs when suppliers and buyers measure and evaluate on-time delivery differently. An organization gap indicates a lack of incentives or commitment by
the supplier to deliver on-time. The operation& gap is the result of highly variable operations created by complexity in product design, product mix, and supplier processes. The
variance reduction considered in this paper addresses this operations gap.
When on-time delivery is critical to operations, two supplier actions are usually assumed to improve delivery timeliness: increasing the flow time allowance (or lead time )t

t The effectiveness of this response may be limited. The ramifications of increasing lead
time are discussed by Wight [17].
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and reducing the variance of flow time. Of these, many buyers would prefer that suppliers
reduce variance rather than increase the allowance. Increasing the allowance decreases
the buyer's flexibility in the short-term, and has the effect of increasing the amount of
inventory held by the supplier. Kumar and Sharman [14] explicitly indicate that holding
additional inventory is an undesirable "quick-fix." Decreasing the variance of flow time is
thought to result in more timely deliveries without these negative side effects.
On-time delivery is typically critical when buyers choose to implement Just-In-Time
(JIT). JIT usually involves inventory reduction by the buyer. Without the inventory, late
deliveries cause the buyer's operations to be very dependent on suppliers to provide on-time
delivery. In response, some JIT proponents recommend that the supplier also implement
JIT. Suppliers are discouraged from responding to the buyer's need for on-time delivery
by holding more inventory. Doing so would defeat the overall purpose of JIT. Inventory
would simply be relocated to the supplier's warehouse. Relocating inventory, in general,
does not improve the efficiency of the supply chain as a whole.
Despite JIT proponents' assertions that suppliers should not hold more inventory, a
growing body of evidence indicates that they often do. A Wall Street Journal article titled
"Trucks Become 'Warehouses' for Inventories" states that "trucks have become the place
of choice for just-in-time stockpiles" [10]. It also suggests that this practice may have an
impact on the economic recovery of 1994. Inventories in trucks are not included in the
measures of inventory used to track the progression of the recovery. This practice also
occurs in Europe. Hill and Vollman [11] state "At one European automobile manufacturer
we were told of all the great inventory reductions that had been achieved through the
application of JIT. Later, we saw a large construction project that turned out to be a
greatly increased parking lot for vendor trucks. The inventory was moved from the factory
warehouse to semitrailers!" Not all suppliers use trucks. PPG Industries has created an
industrial park for their suppliers' warehouses [13]. A buyer for PPG Industries states
"Our company is in the business of producing chemicals-not managing inventory. It's
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distribution's job to inventory products." Freeland [6) found that nearly half of the single
source suppliers he surveyed were required to hold safety stock to insure supply. Other
examples have been documented [1,2,7,12).
Buyers implementing JIT need a method of getting suppliers to provide on-time delivery that is brought about through variance reduction instead of holding inventory. This
method must take into account how suppliers will respond to it. This paper analyzes how
a cost-minimizing supplier's response to buyer-specified delivery windows impacts the variance of flow time, inventory levels, and delivery timeliness. The results are mixed. Using
delivery windows may have the desired effect of making flow time variance reduction the
preferred action of suppliers. However, depending on the cost functions associated with
controlling variance, improved inventory levels and on-time delivery may not result.
The cost of maintaining a given variance is assumed to be positive and is described
as a mathematical function of the variance. This function is called the variance cost function. Two variance cost functions are explored: linear and exponential. Both variance
cost functions are decreasing with respect to the variance. They increase as variance is
reduced. The supplier's optimal (cost minimizing) decisions are noticeably different for
the two variance cost functions. These optimal decisions are compared on five dimensions:
flow time variance, flow time allowance, inventory, expected tardiness, and probability of
on-time delivery (see Table 1 ). For both variance cost functions, as the window duration is
reduced the variance of flow time and flow time allowance decrease. However, the exponential function leads to increased supplier inventories, lower probabilities of on-time delivery
and greater average tardiness as the window duration is reduced. For the linear variance
cost function, the probability of on-time delivery is constant for all window durations, but
the average tardiness and supplier's inventory decrease as the window duration is reduced.
The two functions considered here are not intended to be exhaustive. Rather, they
represent two different views of how cost change as variance is reduced. Timeliness of
deliveries can be considered to be one aspect of quality. Costs incurred maintaining a
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low flow time variance can be thought of as part of the prevention component of the cost
of quality. The two postulated shapes of the prevention cost curve are finite and roughly
linear, and exponential [15,16). If the prevention cost of quality curve increases in a gradual,
linear manner to a finite maximum at zero defects, then zero defects may be the lowest
cost of quality. If the curve grows exponentially approaching zero defects (low variance),
then the optimal quality level is greater than zero defects. The author's intent is not to
argue which cost function accurately describes reality, rather it is to suggest that the two
variance cost functions that have been selected for analysis are those under consideration
in a broader context of inquiry.
The organization of the paper is as follows. The second section is the formulation of the
suppliers total expected cost function with delivery windows. Section three discusses the
optimal solution when the variance cost function is exponential. Section four discusses the
optimal solution when the variance cost function is linear. Implications of the results for the
two variance cost functions and some of the intuitive aspects of the findings are discussed
in section five. Section five also identifies the limitations of this research. Conclusions and
directions for ongoing research are given in section six.
2. Formulation
The formulation of this problem is a modification of the formulation presented by
Grout and Christy [8,9). The formulation differs from these in two respects. First, a
delivery is considered on-time if the supplier delivers the order during the delivery window.
In the prior formulations, a delivery was only on-time when it was delivered on the due date.
No window or tolerance for variation was provided by the buyer. Appropriate incentives
were created to get the supplier to bear all of the risk associated with flow time variation.
Using a delivery window, the buyer shares the risk of flow time variation by accepting the •
cost that result when deliveries are made within the window. The cost that the buyer
incurs is the holding cost of the inventory that results when shipments are delivered early
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in the window. Notice, however, that the buyer does not accept all of the risk, the supplier
bares the risk of :Bow time variation that results from upper and lower tail outcomes. Since
the supplier experiences cost in the tails of the :Bow time distribution, it is hypothesized
that using delivery windows will tend to cause the supplier to reduce variation in an effort
to avoid the cost in either tail. Second, the fixed-value, ali-or-nothing bonus was omitted
from this formulation in an effort to simplify the mathematics.
Let

F = The random variable of :Bow time. Flow time is the duration
between the start of work and the completion of work on a
given lot or order.

A = The :Bow time allowance. The :Bow time allowance is the amount
of time budgeted for the completion of work on a lot or order.
The allowance is the difference between the start time and the
due date.

g(F) = The probability density function of :Bow time.
The uniform distribution is used to model :Bow times.
G( A) = The cumulative distribution function of :Bow time,
p = the mean :Bow time,

u 2 = the variance of :Bow time,

R =one half of the range of :Bow time. For the uniform distribution, u 2 = ( 2~)2.
Xa(A, u 2 ) = The Supplier's expected cost function.
a= The finished goods holding cost per time period (assumed to be positive).
f3 =The cost of tardiness per time period (assumed to be positive).
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W =The duration of the window.

P = The per-time period penalty. The penalty is selected by the
buyer and is assumed to be non-negative.
c(u 2 ) =The variance cost function. The cost function of maintaining
a chosen variance. The function is assumed to be decreasing,
c' ( u 2 ) < 0. The smaller the variance that is chosen, the more
costly the maintenance required.
8 =The cost parameter of the variance cost function.

M = The cost of achieving zero variance when the variance cost
function is a linear function of the range.

2.1. Trading Scenario and Assumptions
The trading scenario between buyer and supplier is a long-term contract between a
single risk-neutral buyer and a single risk-neutral supplier for multiple deliveries of :fixed
size lots of a single make-to-order product. The supplier's flow time is stochastic. The
contract specifies the selling price per unit, duration of the window, and late penalty. The
penalty is collected at the time that delivery occurs and is assumed to be positive and
proportional to the amount of time that the order is tardy. The timing and quantity of
demand is assumed to be known sufficiently early to allow the supplier to freely select
when to initiate production and, hence, the flow time allowance. No expedited, or rush
orders are necessary. The supplier manufactures products on a make-to-order basis. The
supplier must decide when to initiate work on the buyer's order so that delivery will occur
within the delivery window.
In this paper, the buyer's option to hold inventory and the supplier's option to do
business elsewhere are not modelled explicitly. It is assumed that the supplier will not do
business if delivery windows and contractual penalties reduce expected profits below some
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minimum acceptable expected profit. Likewise, if the costs of achieving on-time delivery
are too high, the buyer will use alternative methods of achieving the desired service level.
These alternatives include holding inventory or vertically integrating.

2.2. Supplier's Optimization Problem
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the distribution of fiow time, the allowance,
and the delivery window. When an order is completed before the window, A - W > F,
the order is completed early and is held by the supplier. The expression (A- W)- F is
the duration that inventory must be held. If A < F, then the duration that the order is
tardy is F - A. The supplier's expected relevant cost function is

X 6 (A, u 2 )

rA-W [(A- W)-F] ·g(F)dF+(!1+P)· }Arex> (F-A)·g(F)dF+c(u 2). {1)

= o· Jo

Two variance cost functions c(u 2 ) are considered. The exponential cost function is
formulated as c( u 2 )

= :, = ~~.

This function is convex and approaches infinite cost as the

variance approaches zero. The other cost function that is considered increases as a linear
function of the range to a maximum, M. This cost function is c( u 2 )

= M- (}R.

Flow times

are assumed to be uniformly distributed. This assumptions allows mathematical results
to be determined for the two variance cost functions. The generality of these results is
considered in section five.

3. Exponential Variance Cost Function
The variance cost function increases exponentially as the variance approaches zero.
For a specific instance where the fiow time is uniformly distributed and the variance cost
function exponential, equation {1) can be restated as

X 6 (A,R)=o·

l A-W
~~-R

1

[(A-W)-F]·-dF+(P +P)·
2R

j"+R(F-A)·-dF+1
3(}
A

2R

R

2•

{2)
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The optimal solution is found by taking the derivative with respect to A and R, and
solving the equations that result from setting the derivatives equal to zero. The optimal
allowance and range for the exponential variance cost function are labelled AE andRE,
and given below:

+ W- W(.B + P) _ ai(,B + P)iW 2

=

A
E

J.l

2·3i~
a+.B+P
(.8 + P)~- ~(a+ .8 + P)W2
---=:----+ -=----=-+ ai(,B + P)t
31 (a+ .B + P)~ 3iai (.8 + P)i(a + .B + P)'

(3)

and

(4)
where
1

~ = [216(a + .8 +

P)B + v'3)15552(P (a +

.8 + P)2- a2W2(,8 + P)2]

3 .

(5)

The supplier's expected cost function is convex. The analysis of the Hessian matrix
that shows that this solution results in minimum cost is provided in the appendix.
The supplier's optimal decision is a function of the duration of the window, W. The
effect of the window duration on the supplier's optimal selection of A and R can be shown
graphically. Figure 2 shows how the flow time distribution changes as the duration of the
window changes for a specific set of parameter values. The shape of the curves shown does
not change dramatically when the parameters change. For instance, the curve J.l + RE is
convex and approaches AE from above as W increases. These characteristi c exist for any
parameter values within the assumed ranges. The curve showing J.l- RE is concave and
approaches AE- W from below. The range of the uniform distribution of flow time always
exceeds the duration of the delivery window. The variance and allowance decrease.
As the window duration decreases, the bounds of the distribution bend away from
the delivery window. The buyer's order could be completed at J.l- RE and be held by
the supplier as inventory until AE- W. Asp- RE and AE- W move further apart, it
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indicates that the expected amount of time inventory is held by the supplier will increase.
The supplier will hold inventory longer. At the same time, The distance between p

+ RE

and AE increases. For the supplier, this means that the duration that jobs are tardy
increases as W decreases. The probability of tardy delivery is

(6)
As W decreases, the probability of a tardy delivery increases. The probability of on-time
delivery decreases. More deliveries will be late.
As the window is reduced the variance is also reduced, yet more deliveries are late.
This result occurs because the variance cost function increases rapidly. With increases in
the costs of maintaining variance, holding inventory and allowing more orders to be late
become more cost-effective alternatives. When W

= 0,

the slopes of the bounds of the

distribution are zero. All of the orders are either held in inventory for some period of time
or are late. The optimal proportion of on-time deliveries can be increased by increasing
the late penalty, P. When W

= 0, the optimal probability of on- time delivery G(A)

can

be shown to satisfy the following equation:

G(A)

=

f3+P
o:+f3+P

Prior to implementing delivery windows, a buyer has a delivery window where W

(7)
~

A.

This means that an order can be delivered as soon as it is completed. Implementing delivery
windows involves reducing the window duration over time. As this reduction occurs for the
exponential cost function, the inventory levels and delivery timeliness deteriorate; however,
the length of the allowance and the variance of flow time continue to decrease.

4. Linear Variance Cost Function
The linear variance cost function is defined as c( u 2 ) = M -9R. The supplier's expected
cost equation is the same as (2), except for the third term. The optimal solution is also
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found using the same methods used in the exponential case. The optimal allowance and
range for the linear variance cost function are labelled At and Rt:

A (P) =
t

p,+

W- W(f' + P)
o:+f'+P+

[-a + {1 +

pl

o:+f'+P

W
2

o:(f' + P)
o:(f' + P)- 8(o: + {1 + P)'

(8)

and
o:(f' + P)
o:(f' + P)- 8(o: + {1 + P).

(9)

In the this case, the supplier's expected cost function is convex. The Hessian matrix

is shown to be positive semi-definite in the appendix indicating that the optimal solution
is a minimum. However, the solution is a real number only when 8 is relatively small.
When o:(f' + P) - ·lJ(o: + {1 + P) is non-positive, (8) and (9) either involve division by zero
or result in an imaginary number. Variance reduction will not remain attractive when the
marginal cost of that reduction is large. For At and Rt to be real,

(10)
The value of 8 is assumed to be sufficiently small to result in real values of (8) and (9) in
the remainder of the paper.
Figure 3 shows how the flow time distribution changes as the duration of the window
changes with a linear variance cost function. The allowance and range are linear functions
of W. Moreover, the slopes of these lines result in the proportion of late orders remaining
constant with respect toW. The probability of on-time delivery is

+ - -- --;=0= = :==::;:==
+ f' + P (a+ f' + P) a(P+A<!~=~IJ+P)
{1 + p

G( A) =
0

(11)

Notice that (11) does not include W. Although managers would like the proportion of
late orders to decrease, for the linear variance cost function the proportion is constant in

W. However, when an order is late, the expected tardiness is reduced. The length of time
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inventory must be held by the buyer and supplier also decrease. So although the proportion
of late deliveries does not decrease,

~he

severity and thus the cost of late deliveries and

holding inventory do decrease.

5. Implications, Intuition, and Limitations
The supplier's actions are very different for the two variance cost functions that have
been examined. These differences can be seen by examining Figure 2 and Figure 3.
In some ways the comparison of linear and exponential variance cost functions mirrors

the discussion in quality management literature about the optimal defect level. When the
prevention curve is linear with moderate slope, zero defects is the optimal quality level.
When the variance cost function is linear, reducing W to zero continues to have the desired
effect of simultaneously improving most performance measures and not harming any. The
exponential prevention curve leads to a trade-off in cost of quality that yields a optimal
level of quality that allows some defects to be tolerated. The exponential variance cost
function leads to a trade off between low variance and higher probability of late deliveries
that suggest W > 0 may be best.
Reducing the delivery window may make variance reduction the most attractive action
for the supplier, but that variance reduction does not always lead to achieving on-time
delivery. This research shows that the variance cost function has an important impact on.
whether implementing delivery windows will actually improve the timeliness of orders.
In those case where windows do not achieve the desired on-time delivery performance,
the buyer faces a dilemma. Should the variance be reduced to improve the efficiency of the
supply chain or should a high variance be permitted in exchange for more timely delivery?
The buyer may trade off between these two objectives by selecting a duration where the
bounds of the distribution have not diverged from the window too much yet where the ·
variance is acceptably small. An alternate approach would be to use delivery windows to
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manage supplier variance and to use monetary incentives like the penalty P to achieve the
desired probability of on-time delivery and expected tardiness.
The results of this paper are shown only for uniformly distributed flow times. The
equations describing optimal supplier behavior would be different for other flow time distributions. The results shown here do not fully characterize the optimal behavior of suppliers;
however, some findings would hold for a variety of flow time distributions.
Some findings that hold for other flow time distributions when the variance cost function is exponential follow. When W

= 0,

the variance will not be zero. This is true

because
lim c( u 2 )

(72-0

If W

= 0 and

= oo.

(12)

u 2 > 0, then holding inventory Ufitil the due date and delivering orders

late are the only possible outcomes. Also, the variance cost function approaches zero as

W becomes large. When inventory and tardy costs exceed the variance cost function, the
bounds of the distribution will tend to approach the window. The probability of holding
inventory and delivering orders late will approach zero. This suggests that the bounds
bending away from the window will occur for a variety of flow time distributions.
The fact that the variance and allowance converge to the mean flow time for the
linear function also seems reasonable for other flow time distributions. If W = 0 and
u 2 = 0, c( u 2 ) must be finite, and the slope of c( u 2 ) must have a small enough slope to
make variance elimination more attractive than holding inventory or delivering orders late.
As long as the marginal variance cost is sufficiently small relative to holding, tardy and
penalty costs, variance reduction would minimize cost as the window duration decreased.
The fact that the bounds are straight lines when the uniform distribution is used would
not be true for other distributions.
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6. Conclusions
Buyers, for whom on-time delivery is critical, need a method of creating incentives for
suppliers. To be effective, these methods must be analyzed with respect to how suppliers
will respond to them. The incentives should ideally result in supplier behavior that has
three important attributes. First, the supplier's on-time delivery performance should improve: the proportion of on-time delivery should increase and the expected tardiness should
decrease. Second, the supplier's variance of flow time should decrease. Third, the supplier
should not hold additional inventory in order to make the increased timeliness possible.
These outcomes are sought because they result in improved individual firm performance
and improved supply chain efficiency.
This paper considers whether delivery windows achieve these outcomes. A mathematical model of the effect of buyer-specified delivery windows on the supplier's flow time
variance, flow time allowance, inventory, expected tardiness, and probability of on-time
delivery is presented. Using delivery windows may have the effect of making the supplier's
preferred action to reduce flow time allowance and variance. However, depending on the
suppli~r's

cost function to control variance, improved inventory levels and on-time delivery

may not result. For uniformly distributed flow times and linear variance cost function with
moderate slope, all of the desired outcomes occur except the proportion of on-time deliveries stays constant. When the slope is too large the solution becomes either undefined or
imaginary. For a uniform distribution and exponential cost functions, only one of the three
outcomes occurs. The variance of flow time is reduced, but inventory and on-time delivery
actually get worse. In one of the scenario presented here, improving the predictability of
flow time may not lead to more timely delivery or inventory reduction.
This research suggests that using delivery windows may be effective for inducing supplier variance reduction but may not result in more timely deliveries with less supplier
inventory. Several research questions remain unanswered. What is the typical shape of
variance cost functions? Are moderately sloped linear functions common? If not, what
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method can be used to achieve all three outcomes? Selecting a method to improve the performance and efficiency of buyer-supplier relationships is not simple and could be counterintuitive. Continued research that attempts to generalize and broaden managerial insight
into how buyer-supplier relationships should be structured for efficient outcomes would be
of interest.

7. Appendix
To show that the supplier's expected costs result in a minimum, the Hessian matrix,
H, must be positive semidefinite. The Hessian matrix for both the exponential and linear
variance cost functions are present below.
7.1. Convexity of Expected Costs for Exponential Variance Cost Function

(13)

IHI =

o{{3 + P)W 2
4R4E

+

98(o + {3 + P)
R 5E

{14)

For the Hessian matrix to be positive semidefinite the determinant and the diagonal
elements of the Hessian matrix must be non-negative. The second partial derivative of

X,(A, R) with respect to A and Rare positive since all of the parameters and variables
are assumed to be either non-negative or positive. The determinant
for the same reason.

IHI

is non-negative
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7.2. Convexity of Expected Costs for Linear Variance Cost Function
The supplier's expected costs are convex in the allowance and the range of flow times.
The Hessian matrix and its determinant are

(15)

IHI =

o:(/3 + P)W2
4Ri;

(16)

This Hessian matrix is also positive semidefinite. The determinant and the diagonal
elements of the Hessian matrix are non-negative by assumption.
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Table 1: Changes in Delivery Performance Measures as Window
Width Decreases for Two Variance Cost Functions
Exponential

Linear

Measures

Variance Cost Function

Variance Cost Function

Variance

decreases, bounds of distribution remain close to the
allowance and window until
window is small.

decreases,
bounds
of
distribution remain proportional to the allowance and
window.

Duration Inventory

increases for supplier

decreases for supplier

is held

decreases for buyer

decreases for buyer

Flow Time Allowance

decreases

decreases

Probability
Delivery

of

On-Time decreases, especially
small window

Expected Tardiness

mcreases

for

remains constant
decreases

Supplier incurs _ _ __
tardy costs
buyer holds _ _ _ __
inventory

supplier holds
inventory
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FIGURE 1: How the relationship between a uniform flow time
distribution, the allowance A, and the window W affects
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the window

graph uses specific values for equations 3 & 4: a • 10,
p - 15, 9 - 5, 1.1. - 15, p - 5
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FIGURE 3: As the window duration decreases, the
bounds and allowance converge.
graph uses specific values for equations 8 & 9: a • 10,
p = 15, 9 -= 5, J.1. • 15, P • 5, M • 200
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